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PAPER CONSPIRACIES AND THE END
OF ALL GOOD ORDER:
PERCEPTIONS AND SPECULATION IN EARLY
CAPITAL MARKETS
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This article will explore how the creation of early capital
markets was viewed by those in the throes of dynamic
economic change. It will look at the rise of modern
markets in the Netherlands (during the 1 7 h century) and
England (during the early 18'h century).
During this period of approximately 100 years, the
economies of Northwest Europe underwent a fundamental
change as domestic and international trade burgeoned.
The Commercial and Financial Revolutions were
underway. Land, which had been the primary locus of
production, wealth and status, suddenly found itself in
strenuous competition with banknotes, joint-stock shares,
futures, and other newfangled-forms of investments
circulating in urban centers. The new paper currency and
other forms of intangible property funded new commercial
enterprises, created vast amounts of new wealth, and
threatened the status quo.
The article will use Tulip Mania and the South Sea
Company Bubble to illustrate the threats posed by the new
forms of property and new economic relationships. It will
rely on contemporary accounts, current economic history
and research, and works of fiction that capture the mores
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and psychology of the new markets. And it will show how
the perceptions of people 400 years ago still influence our
view of capital markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
My title for this article was inspired by "A Conspiracy of Paper,"
by David Liss, a recent work of fiction set in the South Sea Bubble in
1720. 2 Mr. Liss did a superb job of capturing the rising capital markets in
England and the Netherlands.3 He had a strong feel for character, society,
and especially finance. I thought it would be interesting to see how
contemporary accounts of the new markets squared with their respective
financial, political, and economic realities; hence, this essay.
In Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rise of the
capital markets threatened the status quo and helped change the manner in
which society thought about property rights, commerce, and investment.
Feudalism has waned. Nation states are on the rise. The commercial
activities of merchants in the late middle ages have spawned nascent capital
markets in Bruges, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Paris, and London. Agrarian
society and land are becoming less important. Merchant classes arise and
the wealth of states becomes increasingly tied to commerce, industry and
trade. Large pools of money are needed to fund ever more expensive wars,
overseas conquest and colonies, and new industries. The need for ever
more money strains specie-backed finance and gives rise to extensive use of
paper money in Western Europe. New technologies and new products
4result from expanded commerce.
The new money and wealth causes creative individuals like John
Law to theorize about money and its relationship to commerce and industry.
This new wealth creates a middle class that threatens traditional power and
2 DAVID Liss, A CONSPIRACY OF PAPER (2000). Liss's works gives a real feel for the
dramatic tensions brought about by the rise of financial markets. In addition to telling
good detective stories, his understanding of finance, politics, and culture is first-rate.
3 DAVID Liss, THE COFFEE TRADER (2003) [hereinafter THE COFFEE TRADER].
4 The London capital markets were filled with "projects" and "projectors" who
promoted useful technologies such as canals. Others promoted flim-flam and frauds.
In Angliae Tutamen, the outburst of speculation was attributed to the
character of the English nation, which runs a madding after new
Inventions, Whims and Projects: And this unhappy Ingredient my
dear Country-men have in their Tempers, they are violent, and
prosecute their Projects eagerly for a time, but, not meeting with
Success, they give over, and abandon all Hopes of ever doing good..
EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 55 (1999) (citing ANGLIAE TUTAMEN (1999)) [hereinafter DEVIL TAKE
THE HINDMOST]. See also infra notes 189-213 and accompanying text.
2006] PERCEPTIONS AND SPECULATION IN 285
EARLY CAPITAL MARKETS
prerogatives-merchants can find themselves considerably richer than
nobles and the landed gentry. There is a mystery to the new. Proponents of
new fangled investments and the wealth they generate often conflict with
representatives of the conservative, old order. When the markets crashed,
as they appeared to in the Tulip Craze and did in the Mississippi and South
Sea Bubbles, society often rejoiced in schadenfreude. The parvenus and
nouveau riche merchants, dabblers, stock jobbers and worst had received
their just desserts.
This article details Tulip Mania and the South Sea Bubble. It
explains the structure of the markets and describes the investment scheme,
paying attention to the finance, economics, law, and societal concerns at
play. It comments upon the market fundamentals and the structure of the
enterprises. It then contrasts the way the capital markets, investors, and the
investments themselves were perceived in art, commentary, and literature.
It concludes that many of the contemporary assessments captured the mania
of the period and the excitement and disturbance caused by the new markets
and investments. These assessments help usher in many of our modern
perceptions of markets and business. These stereotypes and caricatures
persist to this day, despite the fact that many of the original observations
and assessments were indeed faulty.
II. TULIP MANIA: WERE THE DUTCH MAD?
5
A. The Netherlands: The World's First Modern Economy
From approximately the mid-sixteenth century until the end of the
seventeenth century, the Netherlands was the strongest and most innovative
economy in the West.6 During this period the Netherlands had undergone a
financial revolution creating the first modern financial system. The Dutch
financial system contained all the requirements for modernity. It had a
system of public finance and public debt that was managed efficiently.
Holland enjoyed sound money. It possessed a banking system and a central
5 Much of the following section on Tulip Mania is based upon: Christian C. Day, Is
There a Tulip in Your Future?: Ruminations on Tulip Mania and the Innovative Dutch
Futures Market, 14 JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES (A
BILINGUAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES) 151 (2004)
6 JAN DE VRIES & AD VAN DER WOUDE, THE FIRST MODERN ECONOMY: SUCCESS,
FAILURE, PERSEVERANCE OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY, 1500-1815, 665-680 (1997)
[hereinafter FIRST MODERN ECONOMY].
7 Richard Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of The History of Financial Institutions and
Markets and Professor of Economics, Address at a Conference on Early Securities
Markets at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany (October 15-16, 2004) (notes on
file with author).
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bank. The Netherlands had a securities market s and it had corporations,
such as the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (the "VOC" or "Dutch
East India Company"), the West India Company ("WIC"), and the Bank of
Amsterdam. 9
Because of pioneering in shipping, trade, banking, technology, and
agriculture, the Netherlands developed a modern economy with increasing
reliance upon globalization, thus bringing great wealth to its people. "The
United Provinces of the Netherlands had become the first truly global
commercial power-the first hegemon."' 0  It was an age of exuberance; it
was an age of discovery. Wealth and the promise of riches flooded the
Netherlands and offered exciting possibilities.
Dutch wealth and economic power was founded upon shipping,
trade, and the related financial institutions that developed to accommodate
the Netherlands' position as an entrep6t for Europe. The Dutch developed a
superior fishing industry, characterized by falling capital costs"1 and
superior technology. Western European merchants transported "capital-
intensive mass consumption goods, such as herring, salt, wine and textiles,
traded with Baltic countries, which offered grain and timber in exchange.
Trade in bulk necessities is thought to have 'commercialized everyday life,
fostering capitalist relations,' while inducing regional specialization."' 12 By
the seventeenth century, the Dutch herring fishermen had a virtual
monopoly. 3  Dutch shipbuilding prowess developed larger and larger
vessels which were to prove very successful in defense and in exploiting
Asian and Atlantic trade.
With the Dutch Revolt (beginning in 1567 and ultimately known as
the Eighty Years' War), the state was re-constituted. Prior to the revolt,
8 Shares in the VOC were first traded on the Amsterdam bourse in 1611. JOHN
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 20 (2003).
9 The VOC and the WIC were technically not corporations; they operated as limited
partnerships. Their risk sharing structure and limited liability enabled these enterprises
to undertake important economic activities. The corporate form meant businesses were
capable of both more efficient borrowing and deployment of capital. The innovative
financial structure and operations of the Dutch East India Company are described in:
Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between
Entrepreneurs and Outside Investors (July 25, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-567941.
10 Julia Adams, Trading States, Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early
Modern Dutch Development, 36 COMP. STUD. IN SOCIETY & HIST. No. 2, 319 (1994)
[hereinafter Trading States, Trading Places].
I Richard W. Unger, Dutch Herring, Technology, and International Trade in the
Seventeenth Century, 40 J. ECON. HIST., Vol. 2, 253, 258 (1980) [hereinafter Dutch
Herring, Technology, and International Trade].
12 Trading States, Trading Places, supra note 10, at 321 (footnote omitted). This was
the "mother trade" upon which Dutch prosperity rested; Dutch Herring, Technology,
and International Trade, supra note 11, at 253.
13 Dutch Herring, Technology, and International Trade, supra note 11, at 276.
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merchants functioned primarily as agents for merchants in other regions.
4
After the revolt, the state and merchants interests were conjoined; "the
position of the merchants within the governing coalition, particularly the
long-distance merchants of the colonial and rich trades, was greatly
strengthened."
1 5
Amsterdam and Dutch primacy was supported by expertise in a
myriad of trade-related fields: "[e]xpert knowledge of market conditions the
world over, skill in appraisal and classification of merchandise, informed
brokerage, commission, and wholesale services, credit, insurance, and
exchange facilities-all these were to reach their highest development for
the seventeenth century in Amsterdam.,
16
By the 1550s the Dutch had employed futures in grain (before the
harvest) and herring (before the fish were caught).17 Money made in futures
was described thus:
And this bargaining is most proper for such and the like
commodities, the price whereof doth quickly rise and fall,
and are also commodious when a mans [sic] money is not so
ready to buy much, and to make a great employment with
little money, which happeneth upon some sudden advice
many times unexpected, whereupon men are very hot either
to buy or sell: which is much used in Flanders in buying of
Herring, before they are catched, by "stellegelt," as they call
it, that is by a summe of money agreed upon to be paid, if the
partie doeth repent himselfe of the bargaine.... 18
By the seventeenth, century futures were traded in such goods as
pepper, coffee, cacao, saltpeter, whale oil and whalebone. 19 In 1609,
"futures trading" emerged for shares in the Dutch East India Company,
where a disgruntled former owner tried to organize "bears" to drive down
20the price.
14 Trading States, Trading Places, supra note 10, at 325.
" Id. at 329.
16 VIOLET BARBOUR, CAPITALISM IN AMSTERDAM IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 21
(1950) [hereinafter CAPITALISM IN AMSTERDAM].
17 FIRST MODERN ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 150.
Is CAPITALISM IN AMSTERDAM, supra note 16, at 74, citing CONSUETUDO, VEL, LEX
MERCATORIA (2d. ed, London, 1686).
19 FIRST MODERN ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 150.
20 Id. at 151.
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B. Tulip Mania or Innovative Futures Market?
Tulip Mania (1634-1637) is constantly offered as an example of a
market truly gone manic. Investors in tulip bulbs are often seen as rubes
that lost fortunes and destroyed the Dutch economy over wild speculation in
tulip bulbs. Critics of Tulpenwoerde (tulip madness) claim family fortunes
were lost for a single bulb. For some it serves as a perfect model of
speculative frenzies. 21 Indeed many commentators unwittingly report that
the frenzy produced a collapse of the economy that took the Dutch years to
recover from.22 The truth is quite different.
The high prices that rare tulips commanded in Tulip Mania-and
the source of madness of the crowds in morality tales-is a common aspect
of markets for newly developed varieties of prized goods. "A standard
pricing pattern arises for new varieties of flowers, even in modern markets.
When a particularly prized variety is developed, its original bulb sells for a
high price. As bulbs accumulate, the variety's price falls rapidly; after less
than 30 years, bulbs sell at their reproduction cost.
23
Even today, rare bulbs can command prices equalling that of
substantial homes.24  Little economic dislocation resulted from tulip
21 In conventional usage, a bubble is a rise in the price of an asset that
feeds on itself but is unrelated to any fundamental change in the
value of the asset. Thus, an increase in the price causes further
increase in price. At some point, asset holders become persuaded
that the increases can't possibly continue and selling begins, which
causes others to sell even faster because they are now persuaded the
bubble has burst.
Phillip Caruso & Virginia Paganelli Caruso, Book Reviews: Great Bubbles, 37 Bus.
ECON. 67 (2002).
22 The truth is vastly different. The Dutch were "a great power inside and outside of
Europe for almost a century." PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 67 (1987).
During the economic "devastation" that followed the tulip bubble collapse, the Dutch
continued to field an army of 100,000 men and rostered large fleets (on a population
base of 1.5 million). PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF EARLY MANIAS 20 (2000) [hereinafter FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES]. This is no mean
feat for an economy allegedly on its back because of the tulip bubble. The continued
prosperity, the vibrancy of its capital markets, and Holland's continued international
importance belie any substantial effect of the speculation.
23 Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES No. 2, 35, 38
(Spring 1990) [hereinafter Garber-1990].
24 Even though tulips have dropped from fashion, new bulbs can be quite expensive.
"Information provided by officials at Bloembollencentrum in Haarlem indicates,
however, that new varieties of 'very special' tulip bulbs currently sell for about 5,000
guilders ($2,400 at 1987 exchange rates) per kilogram. A small quantity of prototype
lily bulbs recently sold for 1 million guilders ($480,000 at 1987 exchange rates)". Peter
M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. no. 3, 535, 555 (1989) [hereinafter Garber-
1989].
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speculation. 25  The surviving morality tales stem from the Dutch
government's campaign against such speculation. The speculation in
common bulbs that occurred in 1637 was aberrant. It lasted one month,
occurring in the midst of an outbreak of bubonic plague. It had no lasting
effects.26
C. The Fascinating Tulip and Northwest Europe's Fascination with
It
The word tulip is probably derived from the Turkish tulipan, or
turban.2 7 By the mid-sixteenth century, travellers to Turkey were fascinated
with the flower and imported it to Vienna. The flower attracted notice and
was soon grown in Belgium, Holland, and Germany. The tulip was new
and valuable as the rising middle class2 8 and aristocracy decorated their
ladies with exotic flowers, including tulips.
Cultivated tulips sometimes produce "striking mutations," caused
by a virus. These mutations produced extraordinarily beautiful and rare
flowers.
[T]he flower itself had a unique trick which added
dangerously to its other attractions. It could change colour
seemingly at will. A plain-coloured flower such as
Councillor Herwart's red tulip, might emerge the following
spring in completely different guise, the petals feathered
and flamed in intricate patterns of white and deep red.
Seventeenth-century tulip lovers could not know that these
'breaks' were caused by a virus which was spread by
aphids for the research that provided the answer to a
mystery that had intrigued and ensnared tulip growers for
centuries was only carried out in the late 1920s.
21
Growers would seek such mutations, called "breaks." The new
bloom, "rectified," would be in great demand. The rarest specimens could
command great prices.
The virus was the joker in the tulip bed. Since its cause
was for so long not known, its effects could not be
25 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 23.
26 Save for the plethora of misinformation about its "devastating" bubble which
continue to this day.
27 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 15.
28 ANNA PAVORD, THE TULIP 6 (Bloomsbury Publ'g 1999) [hereinafter THE TULIP].
29 THE TULIP, supra note 28, at 7-9. See also FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at
39-42.
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controlled. Fortunately, once a bulb had broken, it
remained broken and the offsets produced by the bulb
carried the same characteristics. But the virus had the
effect of weakening the tulip, so offsets were not produced
so freely and vigorously as might be the case with a virus-
free bulb. Consequently, fine broken varieties such as
"Semper Augustus" were slow to increase, and that in turn
increased their value.30
D. The Market for Futures in Tulips Develops
There was indeed speculation in bulbs; a tulip bulb futures market
developed to fund the horticulture. By the 1 620s the tulip had become the
flower of fashion. 31 A futures market for tulips gradually emerged for
32professional horticulturists and speculators. Buying in the winter for
future delivery came into practice around 1634, that is, contracts for future
delivery were made during the fall and winter. Like present day futures
markets, these options, or futures, only required a small percentage of the
purchase price for the option. But there were substantial and consequential
differences as will be seen.
The market extended to the "future" sale for full bulbs.
Horticulturists and speculators alike sought bulbs that contained the mosaic
virus that produced fantastic "breaks." The high price for tulips was for
particularly beautiful broken bulbs. Single colored breeder bulbs, except
for their potential as "breaks," were not highly valued. Breaking was
unpredictable and growers' pursuit of breaking bulbs could be characterized
as a calculated gamble.3 3
As tulips became more popular and democratized, futures markets
developed for rare tulips, with considerable speculation, and modest future
markets for common tulips. The Dutch were shrewd business people-they
grew their tulip market fast, but not too fast. This both popularized the
wonderful flower and maintained high demand. Very early, they
30 THE TULIP, supra note 28, at 9.
31 Id. at 137-45.
32 Other parties were often involved. "Shortage of land was a constant problem for
growers. Contracts drawn up between buyers and sellers at the height of Dutch
tulipmania show that bulbs were often grown on plots belonging to a third party, who
doubtless took a cut from any proceeds." Id at 151.
33 Because the cause of the "breaks" was not discovered until the late 1920s,
horticulturists, growers, and florists were required to speculate on which bulbs would
"break." Thus, these futures were somewhat riskier than futures in herring or grain.
The issue with herring and grain was quantity and quality, determined by weather, and
sometimes, naval interdiction by rival commercial powers. With tulips it was different
because as talented as the Dutch growers and horticulturists were, they lacked scientific
precision in determining which bulbs would produce the critical "daughters" and what
splendor those "daughters" would take. See THE TULIP, supra note 28, at 7-9.
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commodified the trade by selling bulbs by weight. The standard of measure
was the azen. Twenty-one azen equaled one gram. "The weight was
important, for the larger the bulb, the more likely to flower and to produce
the precious offset, the daughter bulb.,
34
Once the concept of the azen had taken hold, these azens
could be traded on their own account, without the bulbs
actually changing hands at all. The azens took on a
'futures' life of their own and the tulip itself. . . "became
an abstraction, a name, a symbol interchangeable with a
certain amount of money. 35
Both peaked in late winter, just before the delivery of the bulbs. 6
The premium for the ultra rare breaks did not last long.
Horticulturists bred them to reap profits. This breeding spread the variety
and made it more accessible and common. Some of the rare tulips mutated
rapidly into a more common form, reducing the value of those bulbs but
also heightening the speculation for rare and productive bulbs. New rare
varieties depressed the prices for older varieties. As the prices dropped,
tulip production spread. 7
The successful development of the Dutch economy in the
seventeenth century required striking a balance between "safe" investments
and "speculations" or "unsafe" investments. The oligarchy and magistrates
recognized some speculations needed to be tolerated because growth
depended upon undertaking new and risky ventures. Safe investments were
activities with extensive public regulation like marine insurance, the
Wisselbank (a note-issuing bank), and Baltic trade, which the Dutch
monopolized.38
Riskier, but critical investments, were the Dutch East India
Company and the West India Company.39 Risky and suspect investments
included "windhandel" or "trading in the wind" (trading shares the
investors doesn't possess: think stock options). Such investments were
banned by an edict in 1610.40
3 4 1d. at 6 n.1.
35 Id. at 7 (citing ZBIGNIEW HERBERT, STILL LIFE WITH A BRIDLE: ESSAYS AND
APOCRYPHAS (Ecco Press 1993) (1991).
36 This is to be expected in an agricultural market. Prices typically peak when the
commodity is in short supply and its quality is unknown.
37 This would seem to lower the cost of production and returns to investors. However,
the Dutch were careful in husbanding the growth of their luxury goods by seeking
spectacular varieties for the wealthy and enjoying growth of tulip production to serve
the rising middle class.
38 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 33.
39 Id. at 33-34.
40 Id. at 34.
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The tulips futures market lacked some of the features of modern
futures markets. Sales for future delivery were permitted for those
investors who actually owned shares. We can see that futures for bulbs
would fall into the prohibited activity category because most of the
speculators would not own the bulbs they were trading.4 1 While futures for
hedging were permitted, the authorities decried futures trading as immoral
42gambling and edicts precluded civil enforcement of these contracts. This
edict was extended when the war with Spain renewed in 1630, and again in
1636.
43
Future traders were not prosecuted. However, legal enforcement of
the contracts was refused. The process "an appeal to Frederick" (or to the
Prince) permitted the buyer of a futures contract to renege with the backing
of the courts. Nevertheless, future trading and selling short were tolerated
and thrived with private enforcement. Repudiation might result in the
trader being excluded from the bourse. Reputation and the desire for profits
from future trading persuaded most traders to honor their contracts. Only
when traders faced bankruptcy did they choose to dishonor the contracts.
44
Thus while futures trading in tulips and other commodities was
frowned upon by the magistrates and authorities, it thrived. Even though
such trading was banned by the edicts and unenforceable in the courts, by
the mid-1630s the Dutch had created a developed and sophisticated futures
market for tulips. It was soundly financed and relied principally upon
moral suasion and reputation for enforcement.
E. The Tulip Mania
By 1634 the market for tulip bulbs included both professional
florists and growers as well as speculators. During the next two years an
informal futures market had also developed. Amid an outbreak of Bubonic
Plague in the summer of 1636, traders met in groups called "colleges" in
taverns. Buyers were required to pay 1/20 guilder per contract with a
maximum of three guilders for each deal, or "wine money," a modest
41 Many of the tavern-formed tulip contracts were "naked options." Naked options are
the riskiest form of options because the writer of the option must go into the market to
procure the shares or commodity to fulfil the contract. In a rising market, writers of
"puts" will be squeezed as they scamper to cover the contract at settlement. For more
on options, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND
CLIENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS § 18.3 (1993).
42 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 34.
43 id.
44 Id. at. 34-35. A number of the non-professionals who entered the game may have lost
money or even gone bankrupt because they borrowed money to enter the market
initially or during their trades. Under these circumstances, the debt would still be due
even though the contract they were funding was unenforceable. These speculators were
still liable for the funds advanced, but not legally liable to close on the futures contract!
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45 46
amount. Margins were not required for either party . Typical buyers did
not possess the cash until closing. Sellers did not possess the bulbs.
Neither party expected delivery on settlement. Payment of the amount
between the contract price and settlement price was required. 47 Contracts
were not repriced according to market fluctuations; there were no margin
requirements to prompt compliance; commitments were to individuals
rather than an exchange. In modern practice:
[t]he futures exchange has a clearing association that serves as
a guarantor of all futures contracts and reduces the default risk
significantly . . . . At the end of every business day, the
futures' clearing association interposes itself between the two
parties to a futures contract, assuming the opposite side of each
transaction . . . . [and] also serves as a guarantor of every
futures contract.4 8
These protections were absent from the Dutch tulip market and their
absence undoubtedly contributed to that market's turbulence.
Settlement price was "determined by that at which most bargains
were made," undoubtedly at the expiration date of the contract (which is the
modern practice).49 In the event of a market collapse, gross, rather than net,
45 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 44. See Garber for a description of the
trading in the tavern groups called colleges. Id at 44-45. Schama also describes the
tavern trading: There were three methods of buying, the simplest through Dutch
auction, at which the seller began with a high price and reduced it until a bid was
offered. The more common method of dealing, though, was either "through the plates"
or "through the nought." In the former, wooden discs with value units inscribed on
them were circulated, those receiving them having to make a bid. Sellers were
forbidden to offer their own goods directly but to intimate in some strangely roundabout
way they would sell for a price that have been offered. When some sort of convergence
was noted, the two parties and proxies haggled together privately, marking their agreed
price with chalk marks on the discs. If the deal went through, the marks remained; if
not, they were wiped off by one party or the other. Whoever withdrew paid a small fee
to the other as compensation. "In the nought" had the seller draw a design on a slate
and place a sum of money in it to act as a premium incentive to whoever bidded highest
at auction. SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES: AN INTERPRETATION OF
DUTCH CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 359-60 (1987) [hereinafter EMBARRASSMENT OF
RICHES].
46 The margin requirement protects the futures market by ensuring that the players are
capable of settling on the contracts. A defect of the tulip market was the lack of such a
requirement. Hence, unschooled, amateurs freely entered the market and distorted it
during the height of Tulip Mania because they had so little at risk.
47 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 44-45.
48 Avraham Kamara, Marker Trading Structures and Asset Pricing: Evidence From
The Treasury-Bill Markets, 1 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES No. 4, 357-75, 358-59 (1998).
49 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 46.
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positions would have to be unravelled.50  We can readily see that the
primitive character of the legal and accounting conventions would make
any collapse a mess to set right.
Peter Garber speculates that an exogenous event-the Bubonic
Plague outbreak-prompted the Tulip Mania and brought common,
unsophisticated investors into the futures market.5' From 1635-1637 the
plague devastated the Netherlands. Over 17,000 people were killed in
Amsterdam in 1636 (1/6 of the population). Leiden lost over 14,000 (1/3 of
its 1622 population).52 The Dutch faced a heightened probability of death
by plague and imminent invasion by Spain during 1635-1637, when Tulip
Mania was at its height. The rumors of war and the hideous plague caused
a gambling outbreak. Gamblers, with death at the door, would have nothing
to lose by speculating in tulips. Because of the legal prohibitions, the
contracts remained unenforceable. If the gamblers "won," they would
receive a windfall. If they lost, they could ignore the contract because they
did not have to worry about being excluded from the bourse. These Dutch,
under perceived death sentence, could "bet the house" without recourse or
remorse. These wild gambles had no structural connection to the
underlying futures market in tulips. But their bets would cause temporary
gyrations and dislocations that led to increased regulation and moral
disapprobation.
Serious and substantial tulip traders were not affected by the new
speculative markets taking place in taverns.5 3 Major traders possessed
substantial capital and enjoyed access to the capital markets. Short sales
would also have required substantial capital and sound credit.54 During
most of the tulip speculation, the astonishingly high prices centered on the
rare bulbs. 55
Tulip prices collapsed in February 1637.56 There was a general
suspension of settlements for contracts coming due. Florists proposed that
contracts before November 30, 1636, should be executed and honored.57
Later contracts would give the buyer the right to reject the contract on
payment of ten percent of the sales price. The Dutch authorities did not
50 1d. at 45.
51 Id. at 37-3 8. Pavord speculates that the plague caused a shortage of labor, "perhaps
improve[ing] wages so dramatically that, for the first time in their lives, bricklayers,
carpenters, woodcutters and plumbers had money to lose[.]" THE TULIP, supra note 28,
at 159.
52 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 37.
53 Id. at 46.
54 
id.
55 This was to be expected for markets in rare bulbs. "Common bulbs became objects
of speculation among the lower classes in a future market which emerged in November
1636. These markets were located in local taverns, and each sale was associated with a
payment of'wine money."' Garber-1990, supra note 23, at 39.
56 FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 44.57 1d. at 61.
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accept the proposal. In April, Holland suspended all contracts, giving the
seller the right to sell at market prices during the suspension. 58 Thus
growers were released to market the bulbs in June.59  Other avenues of
settlement followed. For instance, Haarlem permitted buyers to avoid the
contract upon payment of 3.5 percent of the contract price.60
The courts did not uphold the contracts but local settlements were
worked out. 6 1 This modest frenzy, fuelled by novice speculators, immune
from enforcement (but not death), petered out. The tulip markets returned
to normal with little lasting effect upon the vibrant commerce of the
Netherlands.
The Dutch market for tulip futures arose because of a convergence
of factors: trade, increased globalization, specialization in commerce and
finance, and a rising middle class and prosperous population. The Dutch
futures market for tulips was a mechanism for creating wealth and
supported a much-coveted product, by transferring risk to willing takers-
professional speculators who financed horticulturists (growers) and florists
(sellers) and the horticulturalists and florists themselves.
III. WHAT WERE THE PERCEPTIONS OF TULIP MANIA?
We have seen that speculation in tulips and tulip futures were
investments that were discouraged because of their risk and probably
because of the frivolous association with wealth and luxury. They certainly
were not the safest and most respectable investments, like the Bank of
Amsterdam or state debt. Nor were they risky investments that were critical
for Dutch prosperity like the India Companies, the Baltic grain trade, or the
62North Sea fisheries. Tulips and, later, coffee appeared to be dangerousfads-financially and morally.
A. Stock Markets and Speculation
The Netherlands of Tulip Mania already had developed stock
markets, alive with speculation. The first chronicler of stock markets was
Joesph Penso de la Vega, in Confusion de Confusiones (1688). 63  Vega
described the market as a "game [of speculation that] is an affair of fools.,
64
He further described exchange behavior in actions that can still be found on
the floors of the stock and commodity exchanges.
58 id.
'9 Id. at 61-62.
60 Id. at 62.
61 id.
62 See THE COFFEE TRADER, supra note 3.
63 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 11.
64 ,,
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A member of the Exchange opens his hand and another
takes it, and thus sells a number of shares at a fixed price,
which is confirmed by a second handshake. With a new
handshake a further item is offered, and then follows a bid.
The hands redden from the blows (I believe from the shame
that even the most respected people do business in such an
indecent manner as with blows). The handshakes are
followed by shouting, the shouting by insults, the insults by
impudence and more insults, shouting, pushes, and
handshakes until the business is finished.65
Speculators were in Vega's description, "full of instability, insanity, pride,
and foolishness. They will sell without knowing the motive; they will buy
without reason. 66
B. Tulip Speculation
As the Netherlands became increasingly more prosperous, dabblers
entered the tulip markets.67 The movement was not unlike the upsurge of
day-traders and first-time investors during the Dot.corn craze of the later
1990s. "Private negotiations between individuals gave way to informal
trading in rooms of inns, called Colleges. ' ,68 These trades were described in
a contemporary pamphlet of dialogues between a speculator, Gaergoedt
(Greedy Goods) and his friend Waermondt (True-Mouth).
You must go to an Inn [says Gaergoedt]; I will name a few.
I know of few or none, where there are no companies or
colleges. Being there, you must ask whether there are any
florists. If you then come into their room and because you
are a newcomer some will squeak like a duck. Some will
say, "A new whore in the brothel," and so on, but don't
take any notice; that goes with it. Your name will be put
down on a slate. Now the plates go round. That is,
everyone who is present at this company has to give plates,
beginning with the one at the top of the slate. He who
65 id.
66 1Id at 13.
67 Working class laborers and middle class small businessmen entered the risky market,
assuring that it would only go up. This is nicely detailed in the novel, Tulip Fever.
DEBORAH MOGGACH, TULIP FEVER (Vintage Press 2000). The author's rendering is
based upon Schama and other sources. Her finances and observations on the law are
faulty as they are based upon Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Aadness of
Crowrds CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND
THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (Templeton Foundation Press 2000).
68 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 17.
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holds the plate must ask for some goods. You may not put
up on auction your own goods, but if you drop a hint in
conversation, and somebody is interested, you are almost
sure to have it bid for or to get the plates on it.
69
Speculators were certain that their gains could be spent on luxuries. "All
grandeurs were imagined. No one knew how high he would rise in his
estate. 70  During the height of Tulip Mania, all bulbs, both rare and
common, rose in price.
A contemporary pamphleteer calculated that the 2,500
guilders paid for a single bulb would have bought twenty-
seven tons of wheat, fifty tons of rye, four fat oxen, eight
fat pigs, twelve fat sheep, two hogsheads of wine, four
tons of beer, two tons of butter, three tons of cheese, a bed
with linen, a wardrobe of clothes, and a silver beaker. 7
It is reported that speculators paid no heed to the prices as they
intended to sell quickly. Gaergoedt urged Waermondt to invest: "you give
no money till it's summer, and then you have sold all your stuff.,72 The
over-heated market broke and tulip prices crashed. The tulip investments
"violated the Calvinist work ethic.",73 Waermondt has the last word on
economics and morality in the Dialogues.-
[W]hat need is there for merchants to have any style, or to
risk their goods overseas, for the children to learn a trade,
for peasants to sow and to work so hard on the soil, for the
skipper to sail on the terrible and dangerous seas, for the
soldier to risk his life for so little gain, if one can make
profits of this sort?
74
The Dialogues and other contemporary pamphlets sum up the
popular view of Tulip Mania, that the "bubble grew rapidly, delighting
beholders with its reflective brilliance, but disappeared instantaneously. It
was sustained only by air or wind, a symbolism recognized both in the
seventeenth-century Dutch expression windhandel to describe the futures
trade and in [contemporary art depicting] tulpenwoerde . . . ." Flora's
69 id.
70 Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 19.
72 id.
73 Id. at 20.
74 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 20.751d. at 21.
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Chariot of Fools, the original painting by Hendrik Pot,76 and a popular
similar print, entitled Floraes Mallewagen71 (Flora's Car of Fools), portray
Flora in a wind chariot (representing both a varitas allegory and a satire on
the trading). Her associates are drinking and travelling light. One of the
girls on the chariot is weighing the bulbs while the other releases a bird,
symbolizing the loss of innocence. The sojourners are not alone. A crowd
follows clamoring to be let on. Broken tulips strew the road and another
chariot can be seen sinking beneath the waves] 8
Thus, contemporary accounts portrayed Tulip Mania as a
speculative folly that undermined the economy and the morality. 79 They
were bereft of any appreciation of the economic role of speculation and the
importance of futures, even frivolous tulip futures," to the Dutch economy,
and ultimately modern economies. Yet these images have shaped our
perceptions of futures, speculative investments, and market behavior.
IV. THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (1720): AN ATTEMPT TO CORNER THE
MARKET FOR GOVERNMENT DEBT81
Common threads run throughout the history of these early market
bubbles. New finance instruments were exploited: options in Holland;
joint stock shares and national debt refunding in England. All of this was
set against a backdrop of developing legal and financial institutions. The
understanding of these complex and sophisticated matters lagged
significantly.
The Dutch had their moralists who railed through time against the
ridiculous excesses of the tulip market. The South Sea Company Bubble
76 See THE TULIP, supra note 28, at 175-177 for the painting and symbolism.
77 EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES, supra note 45, at 365.
78 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 21. Schama describes the allegory
behind the artwork in: EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES, supra note 45, at 363-365. The
wind chariot was an actual device that took advantage of the wind's bounty. The
ingenious vehicle was invented by Simon Stevin (1548-1620), the court engineer of the
Stadhouder Maurtis (a Dutch hero in the long war of independence against the Spanish).
Stevin was also famous for his military fortifications. MARIET WESTERMANN, THE ART
OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 1585-1717 54 (Laurena King Publ'g 1996).
79 Professor Garber believes that many of the accounts were government propaganda.
Chancellor counters that they followed a conventional method of recording events and
moralizing, probably containing considerable truths. DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra
note 4, at 24.
80 Tulips, once a fad and a luxury for the wealthy and nobility, of course became a
leading Dutch export.
81 Much of this section is based upon an earlier paper, "Chaos in the Markets-Moral,
Legal & Economic Signals in Three Fantastic Bubbles," presented at the Association
for the Study of Law, Culture & the Humanities Conference, University of Connecticut
School of Law, March 12, 2004. A popular version of the paper is: Christian C. Day,
Chaos in the Markets Moral, Legal & Economic Signals in Three Fantastic Bubbles,
85 FIN. HIST. 24 (Winter 2006).
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occurred during a high point of English intellectual brilliance. Great writers
and thinkers such as Daniel Defoe,82 Alexander Pope,
83 Jonathan Swift84
every literary light great and small-speculated. No less a luminary than
Sir Isaac Newton was a speculator. 85 Their writings and sayings preserved
their pungent observations for posterity-thus shaping our opinions of the
events. The South Sea Bubble also had to its credit a colorful cast of rouges
such as John Blunt,86 Robert Knight, the cashier who fled the jurisdiction,87
members of Parliament who took bribes, 88 ladies in waiting89 who invested
on the basis of rumor and gossip, the King and his court who were insiders
and took their profits before the bubble burst, and throngs of common
82 MALCOLM BALEN, THE KING, THE CROOK, AND THE GAMBLER: THE TRUE STORY OF
THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE AND THE GREATEST FINANCIAL SCANDAL IN HISTORY 113
(Fourth Estate 2002) [hereinafter BALEN].
83 Id.
84 id.
85 Newton initially made substantial profits and then re-invested; he ultimately lost £
20,000. JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 108 (Sutton Publ'g 1960)
[hereinafter CARSWELL]. Newton confessed not understanding the market. "When
asked about the direction of the market, he reported to have replied, 'I can calculate the
motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of the people."' DEVIL TAKE THE
HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 69.
86 John Blunt (1665-1733) was son of a Rochester shoemaker who rose to become a
director of the South Sea Company and a leading player in the South Sea Bubble. He
began his career as a scrivener. His work with merchants and landowners gave him
insight into business dealings which he put to good use, becoming a very rich man due
to his investments in real estate. Blunt became company secretary of the Sword Blade
Company, placing him in contact with several men who would become leading players
in the South Sea Company. As early as 1710 Blunt impressed Chancellor Robert
Harley with his ideas on funding the national debt. See generally BALEN, supra note
82, at 22-36. In November 1719, Blunt presented his plan to have the South Sea
Company "incorporate the whole of the National Debt, including the debts owed to the
Bank of England and the East India Company .... " P.G.M. DICKSON, THE FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC CREDIT 1688-
1756 95 (St. Martin's Press 1967) [hereinafter DICKSON]. Because of his relatively low
birth, Blunt was seen as a classic over-reacher when the bubble burst. He was arrested
in 1721 for his role and penalized. At the end of his life he was "prosecuted for misuse
of arms in Court of Chivalry." CARSWELL, supra note 85, at 246.
87 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 111.88 RICHARD DALE, THE FIRST CRASH: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 92
(Princeton Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter DALE]. Garber states the Company paid £1.3
million in bribes to members of Parliament and the king's favorites. FAMOUS FIRST
BUBBLES, supra note 22, at 111. Bribery for important projects was the coin of the
realm. "Indeed, that Parliament and the government supported the funding so
enthusiastically must have served as a signal that official cooperation in the South Sea's
ventures had been purchased." Id. at 112.
89 Women invested a great deal in the market because there were no restrictions on
owning shares. This was not the case in real property investments where the law of
male entail held sway. DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 79-80.
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investors who dabbled in the innovative joint stock companies (Bubble
companies and others). Their common (mis)understanding of the Bubble
still dominates our view of this scheme to refund and monetize the national
debt.
The South Sea Bubble story begins in a time of great optimism and
hope in England. 90  England had been victorious in war.9 1  She was
expanding her overseas empire. The invasion of the Old Pretender, son of
James II, was defeated at Glenshiel in Scotland. The dangerous royal rebel
was in exile in France. George I was increasingly secure on the throne. His
speech that opened Parliament on November 23, 1719, was upbeat.
All Europe as well as these Kingdoms, are on the point of
being delivered . . . by the influence of British arms and
counsels ... so far as Prudence can foretell the Unanimity
of this Session of Parliament must establish, with the Peace
of all Europe, the Glory and trade of these Kingdoms, on a
lasting foundation. I think every Man may see the End of
our Labours: all I have to ask of you is, that you will agree
to be a great and flourishing People.92
The pump was primed for commercial expansion to bring even
greater prosperity to the realm. The joint stock company and the refunding
of the national debt (to create capital for investment) would flood England
with productive enterprises and create even greater wealth and prosperity.
By 1695, there were 100 joint stock companies with £4 million in
nominal capital-one ninth the estimated value of all the personal property
in the realm.93 They were traded briskly on ill-organized capital markets.
94
Good stocks and bonds were thought to be a very good substitute for land
rents from agriculture.95  And they were. Land rents were steady and
reliable. But new investments in industry and commerce represented by
stocks and bonds provided helpful leverage and offered the dream of great
wealth.
90 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 90.
91 Id.
92 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 58.
93 CARSWELL, supra note 85, at 8.
94 id.
95 id.
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The public was passionate about credit.96 New theories of public
finance circulated and supported economic expansion. The law lagged far
behind finance and corporate structures. Civil recovery was expensive and
rarely pursued.97 Indeed, false pretence was not a crime until 1757.98 Thus,
promoters and the unscrupulous could take advantage of the unwary by
offering clever schemes and new ventures for making money without fear
of civil or criminal retribution. Indeed there were even substantial
difficulties in collection of promissory notes!99 As with Holland, the law
lagged behind the financial structures, and anti-fraud measures and
protections in the market or for face-to-face fraud were non-existent.100
A. The Origin of the South Sea Company and the Refunding of
Redeemables
In 1711, the South Sea Company was originally chartered to trade
in the South Seas (the Caribbean basin) with Spanish colonies.101 It also
enjoyed a monopoly on the slave trade to that region. 102 Because of war
with Spain, its purpose was frustrated.1 0 3 It found a new life in 1713 with
its successful conversion of government short term debt to long term debt
and its reduction in interest paid to the annuitants. 1 4  Short term debt
interest was reduced to five percent.1 5 Short term annuities at nine percent
96 John Law was a leading exponent of this new attitude. Law (1671-1729) was the
brilliant Scot financier who crafted monetary policy centuries ahead of his time and
paid the price for his innovation when the French economy imploded with the
Mississippi Company Bubble (1719-1720). Law's Mississippi System, which produced
Europe's first stock market boom, was predicated upon refunding and monetizing
France's huge public debt. For a while it appeared bound to succeed, promising to
solidify France's claim of primacy in Europe. The threat posed by Law and his
economic plans spurred the English debt refunding scheme. For more on John Law see
ANTOIN E. MURPHY, JOHN LAW: ECONOMIC THEORIST AND POLICY-MAKER (Clarendon
Press Oxford 1997); JANET GLEESON, MILLIONAIRE: THE PHILANDERER, GAMBLER, AND
DUELIST WHO INVENTED MODERN FINANCE (Simon & Schuster 1999).
97 CARSWELL, supra note 85, at 11.
98 d. at 11.
99 Id. at 15.
100 What is past is prologue. The Special Purpose Entities employed in Enron are
modern innovations beyond the edge of law.
101 The company's coat of arms displayed the motto "A Gaibus usque Auroram. From
Cadiz [still held to be the empire's last outpost] to the Dawn." DALE, supra note 88, at
40; BALEN, supra note 82, at 30-31.
102 BALEN, supra note 82, at 31.
103 BALEN, supra note 82, at 32, 34; DICKSON, supra note 86, at 93; DALE, supra note
88, at 50.
104 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 92.
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were refinanced and replaced with long term annuities at seven percent.
10 6
This refinancing was a boon to the government and investors alike. The
redemption put liquid capital into the markets when annuitants who
accepted the buyouts offered by the redemption redeployed their capital.
English refunding, unlike that of the French, was limited by due
process. The government could not change the terms unilaterally for the
"irredeemables" (long term debt).10 7  But "irredeemables" could be
exchanged for cash or stock with the consent of the annuitants 10
"Redeemables" were short term obligations representing lottery tickets,
sailors stubs, scrip, lottery tickets, etc.
During the teens, the South Sea stock saw its value increase, in a
large part due to the successful refunding and the conclusion of a peace
treaty with Spain in 1719 which would open up the Caribbean. The market
was also on an upswing as peace was breaking out in Europe, and new
opportunities appeared to abound. So did new threats.
The John Law System for revolutionizing public finance was being
implemented in France, apparently with great success.10 9 That could only
bode ill for England as France threatened to become the dominant financial
power in Europe." 0 England had great concern about the juggernaut Law
was designing and its affect on political power and capital markets.'11 The
British endeavored to counteract it with a refunding system of their own.
B. The South Sea Company of the Refunding of the National Debt
As fortune would have it, the Company was in search for new
adventures. It did not enjoy the power nor the prestige of the Bank of
England nor the lucrative monopoly of the East India Company." 12 Because
the government was alarmed by Law's success, it listened to the
Company's plan to take over substantial portions of the national debt and
refinance it at rates favorable to the state.' 3 The capital gains from the
newest refinancing could be plowed into England capital markets,
commerce, and industry-propelling England to greater heights. The
Company's plan would take advantage of rising stock prices that were
linked to the Law System and what would become known as the
Mississippi Bubble! (These capital markets were linked, and fund transfers
influenced these bubbles.)
106 Id.
107 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 92; DALE, supra note 88, at 73.
108 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 92.
'09 See generally JOHN LAW, supra note 96.
110 BALEN, supra note 82, at 66.
ill BALEN, supra note 82, at 66-67; DALE, supra note 88, at 73.
112 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 93-94.
13 Id. at 94.
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In 1719, John Law, the French minister of finance, had copied
English lottery ticket conversions to refund part of the French debt. The
Company was now prepared to copy Law. The Company struck a deal with
the Treasury to exchange government debt for Company stock."' Bills
were introduced authorizing the South Sea Company refunding." 5
Members of Parliament were bribed with stock and cash to pass the
conversion legislation.' 16 Indeed, the bribes were of massive proportions.
Such was the state of political affairs in the eighteenth century when bribes
were common and greased the wheels for legislation, appointments, and
government contracts.1 17 In addition, the Company paid a veritable King's
ransom to the government for the conversion privilege. The maximum
payable was £ 7,567,503.'8 (This was an above-board payment that
compensated the government for the right to engage in this lucrative
arbitrage. In modern terms, this was a franchise fee. We still have them
aplenty, for example land use exactions required of developers, etc.)
The scheme was noted by Walpole in his minutes to aid commerce
and trading by freeing up encumbrances associated with the annuities.'' 9
Annuities were deemed by society to be less liquid than shares. Further,
capital gains obtained by investors from market gains on the stock would be
used in other productive capacities, increasing the economy's leverage.
The Bank of England, its predominance in the capital markets
threatened, also prepared plans for tackling the conversion.120  This
competition eventually forced the Company to promise to pay franchise
fees totaling £7.5 million. 21 This payment cut the Company's margins
considerably, gave it less to offer creditors, and less free cash flow from
114 CARSWELL, supra note 85, at 87.
115 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 102.
116 BALEN, supra note 82, at 76; DICKSON, supra note 86, at 110-12, 119; CARSWELL,
supra note 85, at 95.
117 BALEN, supra note 82, at 76. Parliament required a conversion fee from the
Company. The fee was set originally at £1.5 million, but eventually grew to over £7.5
million. DICKSON, supra note 86, at 97, 100. Thus Parliament had an interest in rising
Company stock prices, for the higher the stock prices, the more the state would earn
from the Company's privilege of converting the national debt.
118 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 100; BALEN, supra note 82, at 80.
119 Robert Walpole described the scheme thus:
[T]o consult the landed and trading interest of the nation, by
lessening its incumbrances and public debts, and putting them in a
method of being paid off in a few years; which could not have been
done, unless a way had been found to make the Annuities for long
terms redeemable; which had been happily effected by the South-Sea
Scheme, without a breach of parliamentary faith.
DICKSON, supra note 86, at 97 (citing Parl. Hist. vii. 690, 20 Dec. 1720).
120 BALEN, supra note 82, at 80; DALE, supra note 88, at 75.121 BALEN, supra note 82, at 80; DALE, supra note 88, at 76. 1 use the convention of
assessing the fee at £ 7.5 million for simplicity's sake.
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which profits were to be derived. For the conversion to work, both the
government and the Company required a rising stock market. 22 The rising
market increased the value of the shares as consideration for the exchange
and made the exchange more lucrative for the annuitants. Indeed, profits
hinged on a rising stock market. 123
Company stock was valued at £100 par (and the company was
required by law to receive that in consideration for the shares). 124 The
general arrangement of the refunding follows: for each £100 of long term
debt, the Company could issue an additional £2000 in par value shares.1
21
(These conversion ratios were based upon discounting the face amount of
the annuity and the income stream to net present value. The conversion
values reflected a reasonably accurate and honest estimate of the future
value of the income stream.) Thus, twenty shares could be issued at par to
fund the debt. The shares could be exchanged with annuitants or issued to
the public. For each £100 of short term debt, par value of the Company
increased by £1400, representing fourteen shares.126  As the bubble
expanded and fueled its expansion, the Company made generous loans
against shares to encourage the purchase of even more shares. Very high
margins were permitted for subscriptions with as little as one eighth down
and the balance due within several years (to be financed, the buyers hoped,
by rising share prices). The diagram of the scheme is shown in Appendix 1
and an excellent summary prepared by Professor Richard Dale.
We might ask why annuitants would surrender a seven percent
irredeemable for Company stock with a par of £100.127 This suggests the
annuity would be surrendered at a discount! The reason is that annuitants
were similar to present day lottery winners or tort settlement holders who
desired to liquidate the income stream in exchange for a lump sum
payment, in this case, shares. The shares could be liquidated by selling to
other investors, and the annuitants would possess cash. Annuitants who
converted at £200 also enjoyed a gain of £100 as accounting principles
122 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 101.
123 Id at 101.
124 BALEN, supra note 82, at 102.
125 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 104.
126 Id. at 104.
127 In reality, shares traded in excess of par throughout the Bubble. The higher the share
price (the amount for which annuitants were willing to part with for their cash stream),
the greater the discount. Annuitants who traded irredeemables for Company shares
hoped to profit by high share prices, not the ultimate arbitrage that was to produce a
smooth flow of dividends.
Other investors treated the high-priced stock as options and rationally walked
away from further installments when the prices tumbled. See Gary S. Shea, Financial
Afarket Analysis Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational Behaviour During the South
Sea Bubble) (Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, Working Paper No. 0508,
2005), available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/economics
/CDMA/papers/wp0508.pdf
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calculated a capital gain as value in excess of par.1 28 Further, without
violating accounting conventions or the law, joint stock companies could
declare dividends from these "profits" which were in reality capital
surplus. 29  Investors bought Company stock because of these "profits.
' '130
In a perfect world with accurate financial accounting and reporting, the
profits would have come from the value of the arbitrage (the difference
between what the Company paid for the debt and the income stream, as
well as other Company investments). Profits also could be legitimately
taken in modern terms by selling the shares for greater than the purchase
price (a capital gain). Further, during the Bubble, the Company declared
dividends based upon this source of capital. The dividends were large and
fueled further speculation and purchases of the stock.131
Nowadays, substantial corporate procedures must be followed to
declare dividends out of capital surplus (notice to investors of the source,
etc.). We do not treat capital surplus 32 as profits or gain. Yet, such
treatments were common and legal in the early capital markets. Further, as
there were no standard accounting procedures or guidelines, accurate
financial reports were non-existent.
133
To review, the scheme came about because the government could
not unilaterally abridge or alter the irredeemables or long term debt. 134 A
voluntary exchange for capital stock was called for.1 35 The government
mandated the amount of stock the Company could issue but not the
exchange ratios. 136 Indeed, the failure to establish exchange ratios
permitted the rapid rise in the stock prices. 37 Both the government and the
Company had an interest in this structural shortcoming. It is unclear if it
came about by accident or design. My best guess is that it was a "happy
128 Modern standards require this to be treated as capital and any excess above par is
treated as capital surplus. It certainly is not "gain" and cannot be cashed out for
dividends. Eighteenth century conventions permitted both!
129 DALE, supra note 88, at 80.
'30 Id. at 101.
131 DALE, supra note 88, at 101; DICKSON, supra note 86, at 141.
132 Modern accounting and corporate finance permit corporations to transfer retained
earnings (profits) to capital surplus, hence boosting the capital account on the
company's books. But that was not the practice in the eighteenth century.
133 Cf DALE, supra note 88, at 90. This is one of the reasons why it was so difficult to
untangle these bubbles and remains so to this day.
134 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 92.
' Id. at 92-93.
136 Walpole wanted to lock the Company into a fixed exchange rate. Blunt successfully
opposed such a condition. BALEN, supra note 82, at 81.
137 Modern practice in corporate acquisitions is to establish exchange ratios. "Collars"
protect buyers and sellers from wild market fluctuations. Some acquisition agreements
provide formulas for adjustments beyond the collar. Others give the parties "walking
privileges" if the market price at the time of the closing is outside the terms of the deal.
These practices developed much later and were not employed in the refunding.
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accident" that occurred because accounting rules and financial structures
were rapidly evolving. I do not believe the participants engineered the
defect. They certainly took advantage of it, however. The Treasury was
given some latitude to repay the debt early, cancel stock, or reduce
interest-so some genuine risks were also present.
The execution was complicated. It became more complex as the
refunding continued and market interest heightened. The Company's
internal fiscal controls were not up to the sophisticated accounting
demanded of it. The Company lacked good internal records of
irredeemables offered and share demand. Hence, it couldn't accurately
price the shares. Further, pricing decisions were complicated by the
confusion of capital surplus with "profit." Sound external analysis was also
absent. Neither buyer nor seller could price the conversion with any degree
of accuracy.
The extension of refunding to redeemables brought the Company
into direct competition and conflict with the Bank of England. Instead of
exchanging stock for annuities and calculating the amount left over (the
profit on the arbitrage), the Company continued to offer new, highly
leveraged subscriptions. 3 Ultimately, there were four subscriptions, with
the Fourth Subscription asking £1000 per share!139 Thus, the value of the
stock was both devalued (because it was based on the income stream) and
paradoxically overvalued due to all the interest in the conversion and stock
prices. Exchanges took place later than contemplated, and terms and
conditions were altered twice. 14  There was a frenzied competition for
Company stock, other joint stock shares, illegitimate Bubble companies,
and scrip.1
4
'
The Company marketed ever more shares to take advantage of the
rising prices and fund the conversion and profits.1 42 Other companies
jumped in, including notorious Bubble Companies that had no legitimate
investments and were pure swindles. 43  In this market, a number of
legitimate companies also were launched in insurance and banking, but
there were a number of unscrupulous firms that stole from investors.
144
Europe seemed to be awash in magical credit. The Mississippi
Company Bubble percolated, and disintermediated funds from Paris and
138 DALE, supra note 88, at 98-101.
139 BALEN, supra note 82, at 133-34; CARSWELL, supra note 85, at 145-46.
140 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 123.
141 d.
142 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 123; DALE, supra note 88, at 98-101. Again, modern
corporate accounting controls would have precluded this type of unprecedented stock
creation. Auditors and controllers would have required some economic basis for the
underlying exchange ratio.
143 BALEN, supra note 82, at 89-92; DALE, supra note 88, at 107-08.
144 ,
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Amsterdam pushed prices even higher. 145 The shortage of shares and scrip
pushed prices even higher. 146 Rogue companies sucked up funds from the
Company and other established investments. The share price increased and
peaked in excess of £1,100 in June 1720.147 Then, the transfer books
closed.
148
C. The Bubble Act," the Bubble Deflates
Meanwhile, the Company sought to protect itself through the
intervention of Parliament. 4 9  The result was the Bubble Act of 1720,
wherein Parliament outlawed the unchartered Bubble Companies that had
arisen to take advantage of the market. 150  The Bubble Act and the
subsequent prosecution of Bubble Companies by the Treasury Solicitor
ushered in the fall of the stock. 15 1 On August 18, the stock began to fall and
hampered the Fourth Subscription, pegged at an astounding £1000. 5 '
Desperate attempts were made to staunch the descent. 153 The Company
declared a 30% Christmas Dividend; it hawked a dividend guarantee of
50% for the next twelve years.
15 4
The government prosecution of the Bubble Companies had
unintended consequences. The smaller bubbles couldn't be popped without
destroying the Company's Bubble. 155  Amsterdam's exchange rate rose
sharply against London's. 56 Gold flooded out of London. 57 Londoners
145 DICKSON, supra note 87, at 140-41.
146 Id. at 144.
147 BALEN, supra note 82, at 114.
148 DALE, supra note 88, at 106.
149 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 147.
150 BALEN, supra note 82, at 105-06; DICKSON, supra note 86, at 148.
151 DICKSON, supra note 86, at 149.
152 id.
1531d..
154 BALEN, supra note 82, at 135; DICKSON, supra note 86, at 149. A 30% dividend is
£30; £50 represents a 50% dividend. These are phenomenal returns on £100 par shares.
Even at £50 on a £1000 investment, the 5 % yield would look respectable. Then there
was the potential for cashing out on the £900 "profit." In reality this would be a
distribution of capital surplus if paid by the company. But, it would be an inducement
for someone to offer the buyer even more for the share. If he sold quickly, let us say for
£1100, his profit (£100) could be quite great because he undoubtedly bought on margin.
For example, assume Newton bought a share for £1000, but his down payment was only
£125. If he assigned his right to receive the share (like an option) to the buyer, he
would receive £100 on the £125 out-of-pocket, a very nifty return, cash on cash, once
his buyer honored the seller's instalment obligation.
155 DICKSON, supra note 87, at 150.156 Id. at 151.
157 id.
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were selling off their gains to invest in Amsterdam; 158 the Bubble
imploded.159 Prices dropped to £300 by October16 and settled below £200
by the end of the year (f191 in December 1720-a drop over 600 points
since September 1).161 Officers and insiders fled to the Continent.
Directors were disgraced. The Company's rivals, the Bank of England and
the East India Company, rode to the rescue. They stabilized the market and
completed the debt conversion.
1 62
D. The Bubble Post Mortem
England experienced a normal depression after the collapse, lasting
several years. The lasting effect of the Bubble was the Bubble Act which
set back and thwarted British commercial development until it was finally
repealed in the 1840s. By then, England was destined to lose the corporate
footrace to its upstart child, the United States, in a large part owing to the
legal restrictions placed upon corporate entities in the Bubble Act.
163
Finally, the South Sea Bubble was part of an international capital
movement speculating in the refinancing and refunding of government debt
(a great benefit to both France and England if successfully accomplished).
The revolutionary financial theories of John Law and others were put to
work to alter the oppressive structure of vast government debts incurred in
the wars between 1689 and 1714. Laid on top of the refunding were the
extremely optimistic and heart-felt economic and commercial development
plans that captivated governments and investors alike. The Company
refunding failed for a want of capital and for want of a legal, accounting,
and financial structure to support such a great enterprise. The Company's
failure is echoed in the contemporaneous collapse of the Mississippi Bubble
and the Law System in France.
There was a social setting to this bubble not too dissimilar from that
of Holland or Law's France. These bubbles were set in great towns, places
of ambition, culture, fame, and fortune (and fortune hunters). There were
high death rates, disease, misery, and wealth. There was uncertainty about
the future. Financial frauds were not easily punished by the law. Life
could be short and brutal. Deceit in revenue dealings was still common. 64
158 Id. at 152.
"9 Id. at 149.
160 id.
161 DICKSON, supra note 87, at 59.
162 Id. at 163, 170-72.
163 In the United States, the state governments were liberal in their support of new
business ventures, including corporate ones. With no Bubble Act legacy, the nineteenth
century saw the rapid industrialization of the United States by businesses using
relatively flexible corporate forms.
164 It is still common today, even in the United States and the industrialized
democracies, let alone developing nations.
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There was a debased public morality and an appetite for gain. All these
social factors contributed to gambling in the capital markets.
Yet at the bottom, what remains is a rational scheme for the
necessary refunding of public debt that was flawed by design. The goal of
refunding was certainly necessary and appropriate. The method of
exchanging annuities for shares to reduce the debt and provide liquidity was
fundamentally sound in theory. It had been employed by the Amsterdam
banks to fund Dutch national debt during their magnificent seventeenth
century, the Bank of England was to use it for great advantage during the
eighteenth century, and this model would launch the United States on the
road to becoming a great republic of commerce.
The execution left something to be desired. The failure to fix
exchange rates was critical (similar to the Dutch failure to link tulip option
settlements to the "exchange" price structure). Accounting and corporate
finance are also culprits. The Company was able to book capital surplus as
gains and declare dividends from the surplus above par. This, too, proved
to be fatal. There was a paucity of civil protections for market torts and no
effective criminal sanctions-the unscrupulous could engage in face-to-face
fraud with impunity. There were no exchange regulations or required
financial reports that might have assisted, at least the astute, in puzzling out
the fundamentals. These reforms would arrive in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
Ultimately, the South Sea Bubble and the collapse of the John Law
System in France were intrinsically entwined with market structure, legal
remedies, investor behaviour, and promoter cupidity. The schemes were
innovative. The concepts sound, as evidenced by the successful refunding
and monetizing of national debt that later occurred in England and America.
Cupidity, corruption, greed, and the madness of the crowds all played a
part, but the underlying idea was sound; it was just ahead of its time.
V. WHAT WAS THE PERCEPTION OF THE SOUTH SEA SCHEME AND THE
CAPITAL MARKETS?
A. Seventeenth Century English Economic Thought.
Throughout the seventeenth century, English economic thought was
evolving and taking note of the movement from traditional agriculture-
based society to a more commercial and market-based economy. 16 In the
early seventeenth century, the Lord Treasurer held that money was "'a base
165 JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND (Princeton Univ. Press 1978) [hereinafter APPLEBY ].
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creature whereof never any wise man spake without contempt.', 1 66 "Sir
Francis Bacon evoked the morality and Council of Nice to condemn usury,
but also explained that high interest rates inhibited agricultural
improvements for men would not 'labor upon drayning of Marshes, or in
any other good or ingenious device, but employ their Money to a more
certaine Profitt at use."" ' 16 7 A moral economy of biblical balance and
certainty was giving way to an economy where individuals had become
"subsumed in a depersonalized aggregation, 168 because their "decisions
were divorced from their consequences."'169 Debate raged over the power to
maximize profits by setting the price. Some saw this economic freedom as
preying on the poor; others, such as Joseph Lee, a minister, argued that
". [t]he advancement of private persons will be the advantage of the publick
... if men by good husbandry, trenching, manuring their Land, & do better
their Land, is not the Commonwealth inriched thereby?',
170
English economic and commercial thought was advanced by
observation of their Dutch neighbors, who enjoyed the most successful and
modern of European economies in the seventeenth century. English
thinkers sought to explain the Dutch success. R.W.K. Hinton stated that the
Dutch had demonstrated that "private profit led to 'national strength and
back to private profit."",171 Observers were slowly coming to the belief in
the idea of a "personal drive for private gain., 172 By the end of the
seventeenth century, "[e]very index of economic growth showed an
advance: agricultural output, capital investment, imports from the Indies
and the New World, the range and quantity of home manufacturing. ,173
Domestic consumption was at a high level. 1 74 The English were enjoying a
much higher standard of living; foreign trade was burgeoning.' 5 "Daniel
Defoe hailed the period since 1680 as a projecting age when men set their
166 Id at 34 (citation omitted). This of course echoes Biblical sentiments. "For the love
of money is the root of all evil .... 1 Timothy 6:10.
167 APPLEBY, supra note 165, at 34(citing PARL. DIARY OF ROBERT BOWYER 151
(Wilson ed.)).
1681 d at 53.
169 Id. at 52.
10 ld at 62.
171 Id. at 78-79.
172 Id at 95.
173 APPLEBY, supra note 165, at 164-165 (citing CHARLES WILSON, ENGLAND'S
APPRENTICESHIP 1603-1763, 185 (1965)); R. M. Hartwell, Economic Growth in
England before the Industrial Revolution, 29 J. ECON. HI ST. 25 (1965); E. A. Wrigley, A
Simple Model of London's Importance in Changing English Society and Economy
1650-1750, 37 PAST AND PRESENT 51,54, 61 (1967); and J. D. GOULD, ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN HISTORY 156-177 (1972)).
174 Id. at 165.
175 id.
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wits to designing 'Engines, and Mechanical Motion,' a propensity greatly
encouraged, he noted, by stockjobbing.
'' 76
B. The Stage was Set: England in the Early Eighteenth Century was
in the Midst of the Commercial and Financial Revolutions which
were to Radically Transform her Economy and Society
The invention of the joint stock corporation enabled many
participants to invest in companies as an alternative to traditional
investments in land.1 77 Joint stock companies and corporations had obvious
advantages-management for the investor was not labor-intensive,
portfolios could be assembled offering the security associated with
diversification, and the opportunity to invest in large scale enterprises both
domestic and overseas, beyond the ken of the average investor. By the
end of the seventeenth century, England had over one hundred companies
engaged in banking, overseas trade, insurance, and industrial profits.
Wealth and, with it, power were shifting away from the aristocracy and
landed gentry to urban investors, traders, stock-jobbers, and merchants-
servants of the these twin economic revolutions. This transfer of power and
wealth conferred status on the new arrivals and created tensions as the
established order gave way to the brave new world of finance and trade.
1 79
C. Daniel Defoe, the Speculator
Merchants were undergoing a transformation. In The Merchant,
Edward Young compared "merchants favourably with heroes, priests,
kings, and even the heat-giving planets."'8 0  Alexander Pope, Richard
Savage, and James Thompson also praised merchants in their works.1l s To
Richard Steele, "the merchant was 'the greatest Benefactor of the English
Nation."" 2 "In Defoe's work, the merchant's virtues almost define an
Englishman's virtues. 'I83 Later, in the eighteenth century, the glorification
began to wane. The ideal of the merchant-prince continued, "but the self-
176 Id.
177 JOHN TRAIN, FAMOUS FINANCIAL FIASCOS 88 (1985).
178 Id. at 88-89.
179 Defoe had high regard for trade and manufacture and sided with those forces over
the traditional land-based economy. JOHN ROBERT MOORE, DANIEL DEFOE: CITIZEN OF
THE MODERN WORLD 312 (1958) [hereinafter DANIEL DEFOE].
180 Neil McKendrick, 'Gentleman and Players' Revisited: The Gentlemanly Ideal, the
Business Ideal and the Professional Ideal in English Literary Culture, in BusINEss LIFE
AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (Neil McKendrick & R.B. Outwaite, eds., 1986).
11 Id. at 109-110.
182 Id. at 110 (citation omitted).
183 ,
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made businessman was disdained as an upstart, a social parvenu, a mere
mushroom who threatened the social order."'
814
In general, the literary merchant characters of the seventeenth
century were praised not for their business sense, but instead for their
gentlemanly qualities." 5  Samuel Foote's The Naboob (1772) reflected
"the tensions posed by the enormous wealth of the returning naboobs who
threatened the position of the landed classes by their wealth, their newly
acquired possessions, their ostentatious free spending, and their 'governing
Spirit.""" This was not a problem for Defoe. Defoe stated that "'[w]ealth
is wisdom, he that is rich is wise,' . . . and since the route to wealth ran via
trade the gentleman should seek greater wealth by following the merchant's
lead."' 8 7 Defoe also believed that "'a true-bred Merchant is a Universal
Scholar, his learning excells the meer scholar in Greek and Latin, as much
as that does that of the Illiterate Person, that cannot read or write." ' 188
However, Defoe believed that there was a greater calling for people. Once
a merchant accumulated his money, his children could become "'as good
statesmen, judges or bishops as those of the most antient [sic] families."' 18 9
"Once the trader has made his legitimate and much valued fortune, he will
be expected to seek to convert it into land or the pursuit of public
service."190
Defoe, of course, had been a projector. In his first venture, he
invested £200 into a diving engine patented by Joseph Williams.' 9'
Williams himself invested no money, and the invention was a bust.
92
Consequently, Williams received £2,360 for his worthless invention, one in
which he did not invest any of his own capital.1 93 Defoe lost all of the
capital he invested, as well as capital given to Williams as a loan. Defoe
later described Williams as a "patent-monger."
'1 94
Fourteen years later, Defoe invested in the raising of civet cats for
the sake of perfume production, which had become a Dutch monopoly. 9'
However, Defoe had to give up this investment in order to meet prior
obligations, including those that stripped him of his property, during his
184 Id at 111.
... Id. at 115.
186 McKendrick, supra note 180, at 112.
117 Id. at 118.
188 Id. (citation omitted).
9 Id. at 118-19 (citation omitted).
90 Id. at 119.
191 DANIEL DEFOE, supra note 179, at 284.
192 id.
193 Id.
194 id.
195 Id. at 285.
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196
year of bankruptcy. Defoe ended up losing a total of £1,300 on this
venture. 197
Defoe later invested £800 in stock of the African Company, stock
which depreciated to £100 in value when he decided to withdraw his
investment in the Company. 98  Despite this, Defoe "supported the
company's right to a fair return on its outlay and the importance of the
African trade (which he said could not be maintained by the Separate
Traders)." 199 However,
he saw the folly of delegating all trade to vast
organizations, which often substituted stockjobbing and
committee direction for effective personal management:
"we are so fond of companies, it is a wonder we have not
our very shoes blacked by one, and a set of directors made
rich at the expense of our very black-guards. 2 0
The main reason for the African Company was to trade slaves, a practice
Defoe believed to be profitable, although he believed it to be morally
201
wrong.
Writing on John Law and the bubble Law had created, Defoe
stated:
"The case is plain, you must put on a sword, kill a beau or
two, get into Newgate, be condemned to be hanged, break
prison, IF YOU CAN,-remember that by the way,-get
over some strange country, turn stock-jobber, set up a
Mississippi Stock, bubble a nation, and you may soon be a
great man; if you have good luck, according to an old
English maxim: -
Dare once be a rogue upon record,
And you may quickly hope to be a Lord.,
20 2
D. Projectors
Any number of legitimate schemes were launched such as banks,
insurance companies, canal projects, and the like. England's commerce
196 id.
197 DANIEL DEFOE, supra note 179, at 285.
'98 Id. at 289.
199 Id.
200 id.
201 id.
202 Id. at 292-93.
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was rising but the new-found wealth had its critics. One critique of the
system wrote a newspaper:
The World of late has run into so many whimsical projects,
prithee for once, publish the following to see how they will
encourage a good one.
The Projector, by long Study, has attained a certain method
of melting down Carpenters Chips and Saw-Dust, &c. and
running them into Planks and Boards of all Lengths and
Sizes.
Hereby all Gentlemen, Builders and others, may, upon ten
Days Notice, be furnished with Boards and Planks adapted
exactly to Dimensions they want, at least twenty-five
percent Cheaper than yet has been known.
These Boards will be free from Knots and Sap, and
delivered grained or not grained, as shall be deisred.
The Projector promises himself, that he shall shortly be
able to give them Tincture of Marble shade, or any other
fine Stone Colour ....
The Composition in these Boards has a secret virtue which
prevents their shrinking, and destroys all Bugs and
Vermine that come near them.
Proposals for erecting a Company, and raising Joint-Stock
of one Million five hundred thousand Pounds, on very
advantageous Terms to the subscribers, will shortly be
published, and the Projector will be glad (in the interim) of
an Opportunity to confer with any Gentleman of Ingenuity
upon so beneficial a Scheme; and for that purpose, will
give daily Attendance at Exchange Alley, at the Cock in
Birchin Lane.2 °3
E. Bubbles
These new investment schemes were known as "bubbles."
Shakespeare employed "bubble reputation. 20 4  The Volunteers, or the
Stock-Jobbers, a play by Thomas Shadwell (1692), described men who
203 BALEN, supra note 82, at 90-91.
204 Id. at 91.
2006] PERCEPTIONS AND SPECULATION IN 315
EARLY CAPITAL MARKETS
cheated as "bubbling" each other for profit. 2° 5 A venturer in the new
market does not care if the business is reality-based. "'[B]etween us," he
confides, 'Its no matter whether it turns to use or not; the main end, verily,
is to turn the Penny in the way of Stock-Jobbing, that's all."'
20 6
Stock-jobbing had entered the vocabulary and had many
meanings-ranging from trading in stock to cheating on the trades.207 "By
early 1692, a member of the House of Commons was lamenting that '[t]he
trade of stockjobbing is now become the sole business of many persons,
which has ruined great numbers of tradesmen and others.'
20 8
By the time of the South Sea Bubble, some financial schemes were
understood by the population to be bubbles, like airy, free-floating soap
bubbles.20 9 Improbable companies proved the inspiration for "A New Pack
of Bubble Cards.,, 210 Here is the epigram from the Five of Hearts:
They talk of distant seas, of ships and nets
And with the style of Royal gild their baits;
When all that the projectors hope or wish for
Is to catch fools, the only chubs they fish for.211
F. The South Sea Company and its bubble
As we have seen in an earlier section, the South Sea Company was
an interesting financial institution in the 1710s. It had failed as a trading
company, yet had succeeded in its first ventures in re-financing some of
England's national debt. In 1717, the Company, who had already increased
its capital to 10 million pounds, wanted to raise an additional 2 million
pounds.212 In response, one Member of Parliament (MP), John Aislabie,
argued that:
[O]f late years the companies of monied men are grown so
uppish as not only to tread familiarly with Parliament, but
even to pretend to dictate to it, and that, therefore, it is high
time to give them a check, and let them know that the
205 id.
206 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 39.
207 Id. at 48. See also, STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION:
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860 24-25 (1998).
208 BALEN, supra note 82, at 26 (citing THE PARLIAMENTARY DIARY OF NARCISSUS
LUTRELL (Henry Horwitz, ed. 1972).
209 BALEN, supra note 82, at 91. But, alas without their transparency.
210 Id. at 92.
211 id.
212 LEWIS MELVILLE, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 23 (Burt Franklin 1968) (1921).
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landed men and their representatives are the mainspring
and stock of the wealth and strength of the Kingdom23
Melville quotes an unknown author who wrote the following in the Original
Journal in 1719:
If any of the days of us or our forefathers might be called the
projecting age, I think this is the time . . . .If ever there was a
nation that had been twenty-three years ruining itself and recovered
in a moment, this is the time. If ever a Government paid its debts
without money, and exchanged all the cash in the kingdom for bits
of paper, which had neither anybody to pay them for, or any
intrinsic fund, to pay themselves, this is the time. If ever a credit
was raised without a foundation, and built up to a height that not
only was likely to fall, but indeed was impossible to stand, this is
the time.21 4
The MP's who opposed the Company proposal to solve the
National Debt were led by Walpole, who urged that the Company:
countenanced the pernicious practice of stock-jobbing, by diverting
the genius of the nation from trade and industry; that it held out a
dangerous lure for decoying the unwary to their ruin by a false
prospect of gain, and to part with the gradual profits of their labour
for imaginary wealth. In vain he insisted that if the proposal of the
South Sea Company should be accepted, the rise of their stock
ought to be limited .... [I]t was to raise artificially the value of the
stock by exciting and keeping up a general infatuation, and by
promoting dividends out of funds which would not be adequate to
the purpose. In vain he predicted that if the establishment
succeeded, the Directors would become masters of the Kingdom,
and control the resolutions of the Legislature; or if it did not
succeed, the failure would cause a general discontent.2 15
Other MP's opposed the Company because it would allow
foreigners to double their money, then withdraw their investment and take it
216to other countries.. Also, the artificial rise of Company stock could
"decoy unwary people to their ruin . ,217 Finally, the Company was
213 Id. at 24-25.
214 Id. at 34.
215 Id. at 42-43. Compare this with the lament of Waermondt, the moralist, in the
Dialogues, supra note 74.216 Id. at 49. And we still fear foreign investment. See the brouhaha over Dubai Ports
World.
217 id
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feared to be, due to its enormous capitalization (30 million pounds), too
powerful and might have too much influence in the political arena.2 8
Lord Cowper stated that "'like the Trojan horse was ushered in, and
received with great pomp and acclamation, but which was contrived for
treachery and destruction.'"
21 9
Lord Sunderland defended the decision, stating that the directors of
the Company would do their best to make money to solve the National Debt
problem, but also had a prospect of private gain. Sunderland believed that
it was reasonable for the directors to profit from sound management and
industry .22
G. The 'Boom' in the Stock of the South Sea Company, April July,
1720
Edward Harley wrote that "'[t]he spirit of stock-jobbing is rising to
a higher degree than ever' in February of 1720. 22  Mrs. Windham wrote
that "'ladies sell their jewels to buy [South Sea Company stock], and happy
are that they are in ... ,,,222 Charwood Lawton said that ."[n]obody talks
of anything but stocks and South Sea, and now and then a duel."',
223
Mist's Weekly Journal printed: "'If you are ambitious, you must put on a
sword, kill a beau or two, get into Newgate, be condemned to be hanged,
break prison, ifyou can-remember that, by the way get over the water to
some strange country, set up a Mississippi stock, bubble a nation, and you
may soon be a great man."', 224 This was in response to the sentiment of the
French that John Law "was regarded as the greatest man of the day. 225
During this time, interested parties circulated wild rumors in order
to increase the Company's stock price. "[N]othing was too absurd to be
said, and, presently, nothing was too ridiculous to be believed. 2 26 Isaac
Newton, when asked about "the continuance of the rising of the stock,
answered that he could not calculate the madness of people." 227
218 MELVILLE, supra note 212, at 49.
219 Id. at 50.
220 Id. at 50-51.
221 Id. at 53.
222 Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
223 Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
224 MELVILLE, supra note 212, at 56. This quote has been attributed to Defoe. See
DANIEL DEFOE, supra note 179, at 292-93.
225 MELVILLE, supra note 212, at 56.226 Id. at 57.
227 Id. at 58.
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H. Stock of the South Sea Company Slumps, August September,
1720
Eustace Budgell, in a statement attempting to lend support to the
directors during the slump, added that "'but the most artful story, the most
malicious falsehood, that our enemies have given out is, that two or three of
our very Directors, that some of our own body, have basely betrayed the
trust reposed in them, and have been the chief causes of the present
confusions.'" 228 He stated that he could not believe that men who had been
"'entrusted with the fortunes of so many of their fellow-subjects, could
engage in so base a design.', 229 Budgell stated that the directors could, if
they wished and were '.wicked," ''.get a great deal of money at the expense
of those who trusted them' and if they did, they would not be "'safe in the
enjoyment of it."' 23  He only stated this to "'show how unlikely, how
improbably, a falsehood the malice of our enemies has invented.' 231 This
prompted one of the directors, Robert Chester, to emphatically rebut the
idea suggested by Budgell. Chester's rebuttal was satisfactory to the public,
but the public was alarmed that none of the other directors took the
opportunity to follow suit, although James Craggs, the elder, stated that the
idea Budgell floated was a result of the many enemies of the Company as a
by-product of jealousy.
I. The Nation in Distress and Public Outcry, October - November,
1720
The public outcry among the upper and middle classes was
enormous during this crisis. The general sense was that of anger, and a
desire to punish those responsible for the financial collapse. "Indeed, no
man's reputation was safe, and slander was as busy with the innocent as
with the guilty." 232 The directors were unanimously condemned in the
court of public opinion.
Any number of caricatures and newspaper and pamphlet editorials
damned the South Sea Company and its speculators. Even Jonathan Swift
got into the act:
South Sea Project
Directors, thrown into the sea,
Recover strength and vigour there;
228 Id. at 128.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 129.
231 MELVILLE, supra note 212, at 129.
232 Id. at 139.
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But may be tamed another way,
233Suspended for a while in air.
We end with Alexander Pope, once an enthusiastic speculator,
having buyer's remorse:
The fate of the South-sea Scheme has much sooner than I
expected verfy'd what you told me. Most people thought it
wou'd come but no man prepar'd for it; no man consider'd
it would come like a Thief in the night, exactly as it
happens in the case of death. Methinks God has punish'd
the avaritious as he often punishes sinners, in their own
way, in the very sin itself: the thirst for gain was their
crime, and that thirst continued became their punishment
and ruin. As for the few who have the good fortune to
remain with half of what they imagined they had, (among
whom is your humble servant) I would have them sensible
of their felicity . . . They have dreamed out their dream,
and awakening have found nothing in their hands. Indeed
the universal poverty, which is the consequence of
universal avarice, and which will fall hardest upon the
guiltless and industrious part of mankind, is lamentable.
The universal deluge of the S. Sea, contrary to the old
deluge, has drowned all except a few Unrighteous men:
but it is some comfort to me that I am not one of them,
even tho' I were to survive and rule the world by it.
234
A disaster of biblical proportions indeed. Or so it seemed.235
VI. CONCLUSION
So what have we here then? Two very different stories of early
bubbles. Both the South Sea Bubble and Tulip Mania took place during
233 Swift continues for another eight stanzas, containing similar venom. Id. at 144.
234 DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 4, at 84-85 (citing ALEXANDER POPE,
CORRESPONDENCE, 1i, at 53-54).
235 In fact the downturn following the bubble was average for the English eighteenth
century economy. The collapse fell unevenly on the classes. Many of the merchants
and city financiers were astute enough to close their accounts. "It was the small
speculator, the petty country gentleman or the substantial farmer, jealous of the gains of
his wealthy neighbours, who came late into the game, without experience and without
London advisors, who was likely to lose it all." Julian Hoppit, Financial Crises in
Eighteenth-century England, 2nd Series XXXIX, I ECON. HIST. REV. 39, 48 (1986)
(quoting E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 114 (1975)).
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periods of dynamic economic, political, and social change. Feudalism was
in its death throes. The state and landed gentry were besieged with
seemingly grave economic concerns. Industry and trade were on the rise.
Finance responded and fashioned new tools, sophisticated tools.
These operated beyond many of society's controls, certainly beyond its
understanding.236  The elegant hedging operations in tulips were not
understood by common investors and mildly abused during the depths of
the plague. Yet, the option and futures market survives and remains a vital
financial tool. The South Sea Bubble was the result of grand schemes to
refund crippling national debt and spread much needed liquidity. It failed
for many reasons, ranging from fraud to lack of transparency to a structure
few in the market understood. But the idea of re-funding the national debt
was critical to the British commerical and military triumphs that supported
the British Empire.
The popular view of these schemes and their bubbles shaped the
view of capital markets, both during the events and for posterity. In both
bubbles we see people at a loss as fortunes are made and lost in increasingly
intangible markets. Society was rapidly changing and new players,
speculators and investors in paper, came into prominence and challenged
the old order, threatening to turn the world upside down. Were these paper
conspiracies concocted to destroy the old order or were they sophisticated,
but flawed harbingers of the new? I place my money on the latter.
236 Indeed even today economists, historians, and finance experts debate the issue of
whether they were even bubbles. As noted, conventional wisdom holds that they were
bubbles and that society was drenched when they popped. But economists, finance
experts, lawyers and securities experts, and historians see a conflicting record with
respect to the market mechanics and their operations. Professors Garber (Famous First
Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias) and Shea ("Financial Market Analysis
Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational Behaviour during the South Sea Bubble) ")
find rationality in the South Sea Bubble investor behavior. Professor Dale finds the
converse (The First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble). Professor
Kindleberger (Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises) ascribes
bubble irrationality to the Tulip Mania; Garber does not. I am more persuaded that
Garber and Shea hold the high ground.
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The Main Elements of the South Sea Company Conversion
1. The South Sea Company offered to buy all outstanding long
annuities, short annuities and redeemable debts, totalling
approximately £31.5 million in exchange for its own stock.
2. The Company agreed to pay £4 million unconditionally to the
government plus a further conditional sum equivalent to 4.5
years' purchase on all irredeemable debts exchanged by 1
March 1722, together with a penalty equivalent to one year's
purchase (up to £666,000) on all long annuities not exchanged
by then, the maximum sum payable to the government under all
headings being just under £7.6 million.
3. The government would credit the Company with an increase of
£31.5 million both in its nominal capital and in the amount
owed to it by the state if all the subscribable debts were
exchanged. The basis on which debts were capitalised for this
purpose was: 20 years' purchase of long annuities, 14 years for
the short and par value for the redeemables.
4. The government agreed to pay interest on the increased debt
partly at 5 % and partly at 4 % until midsummer 1727 when
interest on all debt owed to the Company would be reduced to 4
00.
5. The government could start to pay off debts subscribed into the
South Sea Company from midsummer 1727, that is, the entire
debt had become redeemable.
6. The government could lend the Company £1 million in
Exchequer Bills as immediate source of liquidity.
237
237 This text describing the scheme is found in DALE, supra note 88, at 76.
